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After Lawrence: racial violence and policing in the UK 
 
Abstract: As the UK celebrates the conviction of two men for the racist murder 
nineteen years ago of Stephen Lawrence, the author draws on research into 
racial violence being carried out by the Institute of Race Relations to show that 
violence is still at very high levels and becoming dispersed to new areas. The 
Macpherson report may have brought in changes to police practices, but violent 
popular racism, encouraged by larger government policies, such as the war on 
terror, is still a national scandal. 
Keywords: Islamophobia, Macpherson, Plymouth, policing, racist murders, 
Stephen Lawrence, Stoke-on-Trent  
 
On 3 January 2012, Gary Dobson and David Norris, were found guilty of the 
murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence, almost nineteen years after he was 
stabbed to death in an unprovoked racist attack in south-east London. The 
response to this conviction within the UK was unprecedented, with extensive, 
round-the-clock reporting of the sentencing and a resurgence of interest in the 
details of the case and the painstaking collection of forensic evidence that had 
been able to place the murderers at the scene.  
That the conviction of these two men provoked so much scrutiny was 
down to the way that Stephen’s death had come to personify racial violence in 
the UK. But the political significance of his case went well beyond the attack 
itself. (Racist murders, after all, were relatively frequent in 1993; and Eltham, 
where he was killed, was well-known as a racist hotbed.) Rather, the murder 
came to take on such significance because of the tireless campaigning of his 
parents who, in their long battle to bring to account his killers, confronted head-
on official incompetence and denial: from the initial failure of the police to 
follow up on leads by people well aware who the murderers were, to the way 
that police refused at first to recognise any racist element in the killing, to the 
way that Stephen’s friend who witnessed the attack was, on the basis of his 
ethnicity, stereotyped as a protagonist in the violence.1 Theirs was a struggle 
which, ultimately, led to a public inquiry into police handling of the case and 
the publication of the Macpherson Report in 1999 with its damning assessment 
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of a police force infused with institutional racism. It, in turn, led to the Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and a change to the law on double jeopardy – 
which opened up the possibility of a retrial of some of the men strongly 
suspected to have been involved in the murder (including Dobson, who was 
eventually convicted).  
Such was the tenacity of the Lawrences’ campaigning that the conviction 
was celebrated as a shared national victory: by the press which, somewhat late 
in the day, had come to back them, by the politicians who had pushed for an 
inquiry into the death and, significantly, by the same criminal justice agencies 
which had initially so cruelly failed them. For many, the conviction of Dobson 
and Norris signified redemption and the perception that much had changed. The 
police said that many of the seventy specific recommendations made in the 
Macpherson Report have permeated criminal justice practice. Cressida Dick, 
acting deputy of the Metropolitan Police, announced how the force ‘can be 
proud of how it has been transformed in attitudes, practice, training and 
professionalism’.2 The Prime Minister, meanwhile, although conceding that 
there was still a ‘problem of people from different racial backgrounds being 
disadvantaged in Britain’, claimed that the UK was ‘less racist’ than at the time 
of Stephen’s death.3   
Yet despite this surge of congratulatory rhetoric, the routine racist attacks, 
the harassment, abuse and violence experienced by thousands of people from 
black and minority ethnic (BME) communities each year, have remained almost 
entirely absent from the political agenda. The number of racist incidents 
reported by the police increased almost five-fold between 1993 and 2011, from 
10,997 to 51,187, with almost no acknowledgment aside from claims by the 
police that this is simply a reflection of better recording practices. Of these, at 
least ninety-six (about five per year) have been murders with a known or 
suspected racial element, and forty people have lost their lives as Stephen did – 
as a result of unprovoked racist attacks on the streets. Overwhelmingly, those 
killed in racist attacks have been males under the age of thirty. Nineteen people 
relatively ‘new’ to the UK – as asylum seekers, migrant workers or visitors, for 
example – have been murdered with one, Anuj Bidve, an Indian student, shot in 
the head in Salford as he walked early one morning to the post-Christmas sales,  
just a week before two of Stephen’s killers were convicted.  Seven people 
(including a 4-year-old child) have been killed in their homes in arson or 
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firebomb attacks and sixteen people have died as a result of being attacked at 
work. Out of the total number of people who have lost their lives as a result of 
racial violence, some cases, such as the savage axe-murder of Anthony Walker 
in Liverpool in 2005, made national headlines, but the vast majority passed by 
virtually unnoticed except by the families whose lives were torn apart by their 
loss.4   
Shifting patterns of racial violence 
Rather than stumbling towards  a ‘less racist’ country, the years following the 
death of Stephen Lawrence have been marked by new forms of racism against 
new targets – underscored by government policies and practices and manifested 
as attacks on the streets, in work-places and against people in their homes. In 
almost two decades, the parameters of racial violence have broadened in scope 
and geography. And whereas a few decades ago the majority (although by no 
means all) of attacks were concentrated in larger urban areas, racial violence 
now extends to smaller cities, towns and rural districts. 
Of course, this is not to deny the long history of racial violence in rural 
areas. In the early 1990s, for example, the then Commission for Racial Equality 
(CRE) documented in painstaking detail the grim day-to-day reality of racism in 
the south-west.5 But as demographics have changed and particular areas have 
become more ‘diverse’, racist attacks, in some localities, have become 
entrenched. For many politicians the answer is simply to set a limit on 
immigration to better ‘race relations’.  
But this ancient adage conveniently ignores the fact that racism is shaped 
by government policies – though its impact locally may be underpinned by 
specific contexts and histories. In Stoke-on-Trent, for instance, a city ravaged 
by deindustrialisation and with over half of its residents defined as living in the 
most deprived quintile in England, the proportion of residents from a BME 
background has more than doubled in the last two decades. This swift 
population change occurred as many white families, with the resources and 
wherewithal, left the city. And, in turn, the racist attacks which began to occur 
with increasing regularity and ferocity at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century (by 2005, a third of those residents from BME communities had 
experienced some form of racial harassment in the previous three years) have to 
be understood in terms of an increasingly hostile political climate exploited by 
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local politicians for electoral gain. Stoke provides a stark illustration of the 
consequences of what happens when mainstream politics accommodates the 
messages of the far Right, whilst at the same time abandoning those 
communities which the far Right targets to garner support. By 2008, there was a 
credible possibility (eventually not realised) of the city council becoming the 
first in the UK to be controlled by the British National Party (BNP). 
In Plymouth, meanwhile, in the south-west, increasing attacks, especially 
on asylum seekers, overseas students and BME families moving into hitherto 
white neighbourhoods, have been met by official denial. In a military city where 
the local economy has been decimated as a result of its declining dockyards, 
racist attacks reached such a point that, in 2003, one investigation by the 
Observer dubbed the locality ‘the city of hate’.6  
In such contexts, the developments of new forms of racism have proved 
fatal. Take, for example, the case of Firsat Dag, an asylum seeker who, in 2001, 
was stabbed to death in a racist attack as he was walking to his house in 
Glasgow. Firsat had been sent to the Sighthill estate, an impoverished area of 
the city (now demolished and rebuilt) then used as a dumping ground for the 
poor and the dispossessed. It was well known at the time for racist attacks, 
especially against the increasing numbers of asylum seekers who were being 
dispersed there in an attempt to reduce the financial and social ‘burden’ of 
providing accommodation in the south-east of Britain. Firsat’s death has to be 
seen against the backdrop of the concerted media campaign targeting the 
presence of ‘parasitic’ asylum seekers; a campaign that both reinforced and was 
reinforced by a political climate within which mainstream parties vied with each 
other as to which could be tougher ‘on asylum’. According to one investigation, 
dispersal policies, in practice, were leading to the dispersal of xenophobia.7 And 
such was the level of concern about the danger facing asylum seekers that in 
2004 the government effectively dismantled the policy, temporarily stopping 
sending people to certain towns and cities on the advice of local police.8 This 
action came far too late for Firsat though. As it did for Peiman Bahmani, 
stabbed to death in Sunderland in 2002; Mohammed Isa Hassan, beaten to death 
in Southampton in 2003; and Kalan Kawa Karim, a man who arrived in the UK 
disabled as a result of torture in Iraq and was murdered in Swansea in 2004.  
But, of course, the thousand of racist attacks taking place each year have 
not been confined to those seeking asylum. In the first decade of the twenty-first 
5 
 
century, with Muslims in the UK cast as a new enemy within in the context of 
the ‘war on terror’, they became, according to the sociologists Simon 
Pemberton and Christina Pantazis, a new suspect community.9 And this is a 
community which has been subjected to a surge of violence and harassment. 
One person targeted, just a few days after the 7/7 terrorist bombings in London, 
was Kamal Raza Butt, a man visiting friends and family in Nottingham. On his 
way to a shop to buy cigarettes he was set upon by youths who reportedly 
shouted ‘Taliban’ at him before beating him to death. Attacks against Muslims 
increased by 500 per cent in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 bombings, 
according to the Muslim Safety Forum, with over 170 incidents recorded in two 
weeks.10 And this campaign of harassment and abuse has shown few signs of 
abating. Of 1,200 anti-Muslim attacks reported to the police in 2010, examples 
included serious assaults, the desecration of gravestones and the petrol-bombing 
of mosques.11  
Forty-four Muslims have lost their lives since 1993 in murders with a 
known or suspected racial element. Some, such as Kamal, were killed as a direct 
result of the Islamophobia and specific anti-Muslim racism exacerbated through 
the war on terror. Many others though were murdered in alcohol-fuelled racist 
attacks whilst at work in the night-time economy. Over the past four decades, 
this section of the economy has grown substantially as towns and cities 
devastated by deindustrialisation have encouraged new forms of investment, 
frequently through a relaxation of licensing laws. As such, a form of economic 
restructuring has taken place within which those from certain BME 
communities are often employed in subsidiary industries – as cab drivers, in 
takeaways, in fast food outlets and in service stations. These are industries 
characterised by flexible, non-unionised working conditions, with workers 
isolated, vulnerable to abuse and bearing some of the true costs of politicians’ 
boasts of light-touch regulation. Israr Hussain, for example, was killed after 
being stabbed through the neck in his taxi in 2002 after an altercation with a 
customer in Oldham. Mohammed Pervaiz died in 2006 in Huddersfield after 
being set upon in his cab by a gang of youths shouting, according to witnesses, 
racist abuse. And it is not just Asians and Muslims at risk of attack in such 
industries. Paul Rosenburg, a South-African taxi driver in the Isle of Wight died 
in 2003 after being stamped on repeatedly by a man who later confessed to a 
friend that ‘I only did it because he is Black’.   
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The point, here, is not just that different groups of people face risk of 
attack, but that the particular economic, political, domestic and international 
policies adopted by governments, in the nineteen years since Stephen Lawrence 
was killed, have both underpinned and exacerbated the formation of new 
patterns of racism and racial violence. But instead of analysing the local racial 
fallout from say asylum policy or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, politicians 
and opinion-formers turn the tables  and define  problems in terms of mistrust 
and antagonism between individuals in communities which do not cohere 
because of ‘self-segregation’.  
In the aftermath of a series of urban disorders in 2001, predominantly 
between Asian youths, white people and the police, a new policy agenda of 
community cohesion was established which, essentially, argued that racism 
surfaced in a context of communities leading ‘parallel lives’. The Asian and 
white communities who resided in towns and cities like Burnley, Bradford and 
Oldham, where rioting had taken place, lived, it was said, in enclaves where 
they never met each other in any meaningful way. As a result, what was 
required was a set of core values and a common, shared vision which would 
create the capacity for cohering identities. What was at stake was a recasting of 
citizenship, one in which rights had to be matched with responsibilities and the 
government had to refocus its energies into promoting integration so as to 
counter the effects of a country which, it was said, was marred by segregation.12 
And so it was only a natural progression for this to morph into an emergent call 
for the championing of Britishness: popularised first by Gordon Brown when he 
was Prime Minister and, more recently, by an array of political commentators 
and policy think-tanks eager to assert a ‘new’ national identity. So, too, it was 
also a natural progression for this in turn to morph into an attack on 
multiculturalism. Thus, according to Cameron, in a barely concealed lambast 
against Muslims, ‘the doctrine of state multiculturalism’ has failed – it is a 
divisive ideological project which has led to communities self-segregating, the 
undermining of national identity and, ultimately, to a growth of extremism 
which has been left unchecked.13  
Policing in the aftermath of the Macpherson Report 
What this shift means today is that the progressive message within the 
Macpherson Report has been undermined and any political gains rolled back at 
exactly the time that new forms of racism have emerged and been percolated 
7 
 
through a series of government policies. On the ground, this has impacted upon 
a police force which, despite being lauded as radically transformed as a result of 
Macpherson, in rank-and-file reality resents the term ‘institutional racism’ 
according to research conducted on behalf of the Home Office.14 And, in this 
context, many of the aspects of policing which were critiqued most vocally by 
Macpherson have continued regardless, exacerbated and reproduced in the 
routine interactions between BME communities and the police. 
The most visible of these is stop-and-search. Macpherson was not against 
the use of stop-and-search per se, but did highlight that the discriminatory use 
of the power increased tensions between particular communities and the 
criminal justice system. Regardless of this though, stops have massively 
increased. In 1999, black people were 5.9 times more likely to be stopped and 
searched than white people under powers contained within Section 1 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). In 2009/10, this disparity had 
risen to seven times more likely.15 Moreover, with regard to powers where the 
police are not required to prove reasonable suspicion of a person having 
committed an offence, disproportionality is much, much starker. In 2011, black 
people were nearly thirty times more likely to be stopped and searched under 
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 than white people, 
leading to accusations of increasing ‘racial profiling’.16 But this is an accusation 
that has been increasingly difficult to prove with regard to stop-and-search 
(though no less true), after several police forces took advantage of the Home 
Office’s removal of the requirement to record ‘stop-and-accounts’ (where police 
stop people and require them to account for their whereabouts) under the 
auspices of cutting back on police bureaucracy.17  
And what of racial violence? Cressida Dick says that more than half of 
the racist incidents recorded in the UK are now detected by the criminal justice 
system and that BME communities now have nearly as much confidence in the 
police as do other communities. But has the police understanding of racism, 
how it manifests itself in populist violence and how the police themselves 
contribute to racism, undergone change all the way through the force? 
The family of Shahid Aziz, a 30-year-old man in Armley prison who was 
murdered in 2004 by his cell-mate who slit his throat and beat him with a chair 
leg as he lay dying, faced a police alleging that there was no racist element to 
the killing. And this despite the fact that the killer had objected to Shahid 
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speaking in his own language and of having to share a cell with an Asian man. 
Or what about the partner of Mi Gao Huang Chen, who claims that the 
campaign of racial abuse they were subjected to in Wigan was ignored by the 
police in 2004 until finally, her partner was killed? These are not the only cases 
where families have had to confront an official denial of racism in chilling 
echoes of the Lawrences’ long fight for justice. And surely, the starkest 
reminder of just how antagonistic relations are between the police and many 
people from BME communities is the riots which swept through England in 
summer 2011. One of the most common explanations for the actions of those 
who took part was the inequities of stop-and-search and a sheer hatred of police 
overlordship.     
Such realities tear down the carefully cultivated façade that this is a country that 
has eliminated racism from the workings of its institutions. They explode the 
fallacy that racial violence is becoming less frequent. The perception that, after 
Macpherson, such racism declined, being steadily eradicated by the criminal 
justice system, is, simply, a lie.  
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